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Korea, North Operational Practice in the 1980s and 1990s
Sources: The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Factbook
    << Back to Korea, North National Security


    Observation post at Kukhwa-ri, not far from Kaesng
    Courtesy Tracy Woodward

    The Korean People's Army (KPA) is structured and deployed on the primacy of the offense. Doctrine stresses that decisive results can be obtained only through offensive operations. The offense has three objectives: the destruction of enemy forces, the seizure and control of territory, and the destruction of the enemy's will to fight.

    Strategy and tactics are built on the key concepts of combined-arms offensive operations, battlefield mobility, flexibility, and the integration of conventional and unconventional warfare. Mass, mobility, and firepower are the three reinforcing elements of a strategy that, when combined with speed and security at a critical point, will produce a decisive offensive strike.

    Changes in force development reflect changes in doctrine and strategy. The military problem facing P'yongyang is encountering difficult terrain crossed by the multiple defensive lines, extensive barrier systems, and hardened defensive positions of a determined defender. A heavy emphasis on special forces is the first solution.

    After the mid-1970s, the emphasis shifted to firepower. The artillery force, both active and reserve, grew steadily, and self-propelled artillery was deployed. Most North Korean artillery has a greater standoff range than comparable South Korea-United States systems. Hardened artillery positions and a forward-based logistics system of underground facilities for ammunition stockpiles, petroleum, oil, lubricants, and other war supplies appeared to be designed to sustain an initial offensive despite a lack of air superiority. These initiatives only partially addressed the problem, however, because North Korean artillery cannot fire from its hardened artillery sites.

    In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to firepower and mobility as a solution. Some experts believe that maneuver received new emphasis when larger-scale mobile units were created beginning in the early 1980s. Force deployment suggests that P'yongyang intends to employ both second-echelon and strategic/exploitation forces.

    Data as of June 1993

    NOTE: The information regarding Korea, North on this page is re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Korea, North Operational Practice in the 1980s and 1990s information contained here. All suggestions for corrections of any errors about Korea, North Operational Practice in the 1980s and 1990s should be addressed to the Library of Congress and the CIA.

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